Environmental Hazard and Residential Value, Location and Dispersion by Levy, Amnon
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Business - Economics Working 
Papers Faculty of Business and Law 
January 2003 
Environmental Hazard and Residential Value, Location and Dispersion 
Amnon Levy 
University of Wollongong, levy@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Levy, Amnon, Environmental Hazard and Residential Value, Location and Dispersion, Department of 
Economics, University of Wollongong, 2003. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/commwkpapers/82 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
































University of Wollongong 




Environmental Hazard and Residential  
Value, Location and Dispersion 
 
 








This paper provides microeconomic foundations to the relationship between the 
values of residential properties and the environmental quality of their location. It 
constructs an environmental–quality-adjusted lifetime-utility function by combining 
satisfaction from consumption over the lifespan with risk to life from living in an 
environmentally hazardous location. It employs this utility function to analyse 
willingness to pay for environmental quality, choice of location and residential 
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The choice of a residential property and its location is one of the major and 
least reversible decisions in human life. The high user-cost of residential properties 
and the environmental quality of their locations have strong long-term implications 
for the consumption, lifestyle and health of the decision-makers and their dependents. 
The hypothesis that certain facilities and land use constitute environmental hazard and 
hence deter demand for adjacent residential properties, has been extensively tested. 
Applying hedonic pricing methods and other techniques to cross-section and time-
series data, a large number of empirical studies, including the seminal articles by 
Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) and Freeman (1979) and the more recent papers by 
Michaels and Smith (1990), Kohlhase (1991), Kiel and McClain (1995a, 1995b) and 
McCluskey and Rausser (2003), have lent support to a positive correlation between 
residential-property prices and distance from sources of environmental hazards and, 
consequently, to the assertion that the values of residential properties reflect people’s 
concerns with the environmental quality of their location. These concerns arise mainly 
from worries about health risk and stigma (McClelland, Schulze and Hurd, 1990, 
Wandersman and Hallman, 1993; Lober and Green, 1994). 
The objective of this paper is to provide analytical foundations for the effect of 
sources of environmental hazards on the values, location and dispersion of residential 
properties. The analysis begins with the assertion that life is uncertain and the 
probability of survival depends upon the environmental quality of the place of 
residence. From residents’ perspective, environmental quality is eroded by any 
perceived type of hazard posed by nearby facilities and land use. Residents’ lifetime 
utility from consumption increases with the probability of survival associated with the 
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environmental quality of their neighbourhood and the period of exposure to hazardous 
facilities and land use. Following a construction of an environmental-quality adjusted 
utility function, the paper analyses residents’ willingness to pay for environmental 
quality, their choice of location and their aggregate level of residential dispersion and 
its relationship with income distribution. The analysis emphasises the roles of 
consumption-elasticity of utility and sensitivities of personal health and income and 
market rent to environmental hazard in the determination of residents’ willingness to 
pay for environmental quality and in the determination of residential location and 
dispersion.  
The analysis is organised as follows. Section 2 constructs a resident’s 
environmental–quality-adjusted lifetime utility function by combining the resident’s 
satisfaction from consumption over her lifespan with the risk to her life from residing 
in a hazardous environment. Section 3 employs this lifetime utility function to analyse 
the resident’s willingness to pay for environmental quality. Section 4 analyses the 
resident’s choice of location. Section 5 extends the analysis of the choice of location 
to the case where the resident’s productivity is affected by the environmental quality 
of her neighbourhood. Section 6 analyses the residential dispersion of a heterogeneous 
population and its relationship with income distribution. Section 7 summarises the 
main results and indicates the possible relationship between income disparity, political 









2. Resident’s environmental-quality-adjusted utility 
 
It is possible that on major and non-easily reversible1 choices, such as place of 
residence, decisions are made in accordance with expected-lifetime-utility 
maximisation. Ms. Jones is an analytically competent lifetime-utility maximiser. Her 
rate of time preference, jρ , is time invariant and positive, but not very large, 
revealing that she cares about her future utilities from consumption.  Being farsighted 
and feeling young, Ms. Jones’ planning horizon is very long – infinite, for 
tractability.2 However, Ms. Jones is aware of the uncertainty about her existence and 
of the effect of an environmental hazard near her place of residence on her probability 
of survival. 
Ms. Jones’ instantaneous income is jty , instantaneous residential rent (or user 
cost) is tR , instantaneous spending on consumption is tjt Ry − ,
3 and instantaneous 
utility from consumption is )( tjtj Ryu − , displaying 0>′ju  and 0<′′ju . Being an 
expected-lifetime-utility maximiser, Ms. Jones multiplies her accumulated utility 









, by her probability of dying at time t , jtf . The sum of all the 








 associated with any possible time of death 










.      (1) 
                                                 
1 Due to large financial, psychological and social costs.  
2 The assumption of infinite planning horizon can be further justified by considering Ms. 
Jones to be a representative of a household and/or a family. 
3 There is no saving, or there is no distinction between saving and consumption, for 
simplicity. 
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      (2) 
where, jtF  denotes the cumulative density function associated with jtf  and indicates 
her probability of dying by t and hence jtF−1  displays her probability of living 
beyond t (see Appendix A, Kamien and Schwartz, 1991; Levy, 2000, 2002a, 2002b). Ms. 
Jones interprets this expected lifetime utility as the sum of her discounted 
instantaneous utility from consumption accruing during her planning horizon and 
weighted by her probability of prevailing.  
Spending most of her time at her home and neighbourhood, Ms. Jones believes 
that her probability of dying by t depends upon the quality of her neighbourhood’s 
environment during the period (0,t) and upon the sensitivity of her health to this 
quality. She takes her neighbourhood’s environmental quality to be eroded by any 
perceived type of hazard posed by nearby facilities and undesired land use, which she 
expects to persist indefinitely. She therefore believes that the environmental quality of 
any location affected by theses facilities and land use is time-invariant. She also 
believes that the rent and her income in any location are time-invariants. Hence, she 
intends to stay in one location after making her choice. In other words, Ms. Jones 
expects to be exposed to the (perceived) initial environmental quality, θ , of her 
chosen neighbourhood until the end of her life. She takes θ  to belong to the unit 
interval (0,1), where 1 represents the least hazardous environment and 0 the most 
hazardous environment.4  
                                                 
4 Consistently with the aforementioned empirical studies, θ  may rise with the distance from 
the source(s) of the environmental hazard.  
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Ms. Jones considers the sensitivity of her health to the quality of her 
residential environment to be time-invariant and denotes it by a non-negative scalar 
jα  ( 10 ≤≤ jα ). Ms. Jones assesses that her probability of dying by t declines with θ  
and jα , but rises with the period of exposure (0,t) to the hazardous facilities and land 
use. Namely, ),,( tFF jjjt αθ=  with 0/ <∂∂ θjF , 0/ <∂∂ αjF  and 0/ >∂∂ tF j . Ms. 
Jones uses the following convenient explicit form to approximate her probability of 
dying by t: 
jtj
jt eF
αµ θ−−= 1 .        (3) 
She interprets jα  as the elasticity of her health with respect to the environmental 
quality of her neighbourhood and 
tje
µ−
 as the effect of the period of exposure to 
hazardous facilities and land use on her probability of survival. Since 
]1/[]/)1([ jjj FdtFd −−−=µ , she takes jµ  to be a positive scalar indicating the rate 
of decline of her survival probability due to continued exposure to hazardous facilities 
and land use. 
By substituting Eq. (3) into Eq. (2) and her expectation of time-invariant 







+− αµρ θ ,      (4) 
which she now interprets as the lifetime sum of her instantaneous utilities from 
consumption adjusted to the environmental quality of her location and discounted by 
her time preference and the effect of continued exposure to hazardous facilities and 
land use. By integrating the right-hand side of Eq. (4), Ms. Jones finds that, living the 
rest of her life in a location endowed with environmental quality θ , her expected 
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lifetime utility is equal to the ratio of her environmental-quality-adjusted 




α +−= .      (5) 
The interpretation of this environmental-quality-adjusted-lifetime-utility function can 
be broadened to include the effect of stigma. When worries about the public image of 
her neighbourhood adversely affect Ms. Jones’ health, jα  can be redefined as the sum 
of her health sensitivity to environmental quality and her concern about 
neighbourhood’s public image. 
 
 3. Residents’ willingness to pay for environmental quality 
Ms. Jones perceives location A to be less affected than location B by the 
hazardous facilities and land use. That is, BA θθ > . Recalling Eq. (5) and assuming 
that her income is not affected by the environmental quality of her neighbourhood,5 
Ms. Jones is indifferent between location A and location B so long that her full rents6, 
j
AR  and 
j










αα +−=+− .  (6) 
In other words, Ms. Jones is indifferent between the two locations if equality between 
the ratio of instantaneous utility from consumption and the inverse of the ratio of their 
environmental qualities’ impact on her well-being exists: 
                                                 
5 This assumption is relaxed in section 5. 














.       (7) 
Corollary 1: One is willing to pay a higher full rent for a residential property in an 
environmentally less hazardous location if one’s health is sensitive to the 
environmental quality of one’s place of residence.7 (See proof in Appendix B.) 
When jα  is taken to be the sum of person j’s health sensitivity to environmental 
quality and person j’s concern about her neighbourhood’s public image, this corollary 
encompasses sensitivity to stigma.  
Ms. Jones explores further her willingness to pay for the environmental-
quality difference between location A and location B by using the analytically 




)( −= , 10 << jβ ,      (8) 
for any location BAi ,= . By substituting this explicit form into Eq. (7), Ms. Jones 
finds that her willingness to pay extra rent for the environmental-quality difference 










− βαθθ  .     (9) 
Ms. Jones assesses the life expectancy of residential properties to be very long and, 
for tractability, takes it to be infinite. Perceiving herself an ordinary member of the 
society, she takes the market capitalization rate of an ordinary residential property to 
                                                 
7 This corollary is consistent with Smith and Desvousges’ (1986) finding that respondents 
would be willing to pay between $2472 and $3199 more for residential properties located a 
mile further from a hazardous waste landfill. 
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be equal to her full discounting rate ( jj µρ + ). By summing her discounted 
willingness to pay extra rent over an infinite period, Ms. Jones realises that the 
difference between her highest bid on an ordinary residential property in location A 
( jAP ) and her highest bid on an identical property in location B (
j












βα +−−=− − .   (10) 
Corollary 2: The positive effect of the A-B environmental quality ratio on one’s A-B 
highest-bid difference on structurally identical residential properties is intensified by 
one’s income and health sensitivity, but is moderated by one’s consumption elasticity 
of utility, rate of time preference and rate of decline of survival probability stemming 
from continued exposure to hazardous facilities and land use. (See proof in Appendix 
B.) 
 
4. Optimal location of residence 
Suppose that information about environmental qualities of all locations is 
complete and perfectly transmitted to Ms. Jones. There is a continuum of 
environmental qualities, and locations are ranked continuously by their environmental 
quality θ  within the unit interval )1,0( . Consistent with the previous section’s 
findings about her willingness to pay rent on identical residential properties in 
locations endowed with different environmental qualities, Ms. Jones observes that the 
market rents of ordinary residential properties rise with the environmental quality of 
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their location and can be approximated by a differentiable function )(θR  with 











































 (see Appendix C). Ms. Jones realises that *jθ  is independent 
of her full discounting rate due to her assumption, which she considers to be the most 
sensible one, of time-invariant relative environmental qualities of the various 
locations. 
For tractability, Ms. Jones takes the market rent of an ordinary residential 
property to be linearly rising in its location’s environmental quality from the lowest 
rent of 0R  in the environmentally most hazardous location ( 0=θ ) to the highest rent 
1R  in the environmentally least hazardous location ( 1=θ ) 
θ)( 010 RRRR −+=          (12) 
and also interprets 01 RR −  as the market rent-gradient. Subsequently, Ms. Jones 



























θ        (13) 
                                                 
8 This assumption is compatible with the findings of Michaels and Smith (1990) Kohlhase 
(1991), Kiel and McClain (1995a, 1995b) and McCluskey and Rausser (2003) when θ  is 





















 (see Appendix C).  



















, the optimal environmental quality of one’s 
place of residence is proportional to the ratio of the difference between one’s income 
and rent in the environmentally most hazardous location to the rent-gradient. The 
proportion-coefficient rises with one’s health sensitivity to environmental quality and 
declines with one’s elasticity of utility from consumption.   (See proof in Appendix 
C.) 
Corollary 4:  If ))(/( 011 RRRy jjj −+≥ αβ , one’s optimal place of residence is in 
the environmentally least hazardous location. (See proof in Appendix C.) 
In other words, the environmentally least hazardous location is chosen for residence 
when one’s income exceeds the rent in that location by at least the product of the rent-
gradient and the ratio of one’s consumption elasticity of utility to one’s health 
sensitivity to environmental quality. Of course, if 0Ry j < , one cannot even afford 
residence in the environmentally most hazardous location.  
 
5. Optimal location when environmental quality affects productivity 
It is possible that income is affected by location. If productivity is improved 
by health and health is improved by environment quality (i.e., 0>jα ), income rises 
with the environmental quality of the place of residence. Ms. Jones extends her 
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analysis to this case by considering a differentiable income function )(θjy  with 



















=+=   (14) 
so long that 
0)]())((()())(([)())(()1( ****2********** <′′′+′′′+′′+ jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj ccuccuccu θθθθθθθα , 
where )()()( θθθ jjj Ryc −≡  (see Appendix C). 
Ms. Jones assumes that her income rises linearly in her location’s 
environmental quality from the lowest level of jy0  in the environmentally most 
hazardous location to the highest level jy1  in the environmentally least hazardous 
location 
θ)( 010 jjjj yyyy −+=         (15) 
and interprets jj yy 01 −  as her personal income-gradient. By substituting Eq. (12) and 
Eq. (15) into Eq. (14), Ms. Jones obtains that her optimal location is where the quality 
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 (see Appendix C). 
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Corollary 5 (interior solution): The optimal place for a person, who is sensitive to 
environmental quality and facing a positive (negative) income-rent differential in the 


































 if, and only if, the effect of 
environmental quality on this person’s income-rent differential is negative (positive).  
(See proof in Appendix C.) 
























, the chosen environmental 
quality of the place of residence increases with the personal health sensitivity to the 
environmental quality, with the personal income-gradient and with the personal 
income-market-rent differential in the environmentally most hazardous location, but 
decreases with the personal utility’s consumption elasticity and with the market rent-
gradient.  (See proof in Appendix C.)  
Corollary 7 (corner solution): The optimal place of residence for a person whose 
health is sensitive to environmental quality and who is facing a non-negative (zero) 
income-rent differential in the most hazardous environment and a positive (negative) 
difference between his income-gradient and the market rent-gradient is in the least 
(most) hazardous location. (See proof in Appendix C.) 
This corollary says that when people’s income in the environmentally most hazardous 
location is at least as large as their rent and when the environmental-quality effect on 
their income is at least as large as the environmental-quality effect on their rent, they 
maximise their consumption and minimise their risk of dying by residing in the 
environmentally least hazardous location. However, when their income in the 
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environmentally most hazardous location is equal to the rent and the environmental-
quality effect on the market rent exceeds the environmental quality effect on their 
income, people reside in the environmentally most hazardous location since they 
cannot afford a safer one.  
The condition for choosing the environmentally least hazardous location is 
more generally articulated by the following proposition. 
Corollary 8:  If )]())[(/( 010111 jjjjj yyRRRy −−−+≥ αβ , one’s optimal place of 
residence is in the environmentally least hazardous location. (See proof in Appendix 
C.) 
This corollary suggests that the environmentally least hazardous location is chosen for 
residence when the individual’s anticipated income in that location exceeds the rent in 
that location by at least the product of the difference between the market rent-gradient 
and her personal income-gradient and the ratio of her consumption elasticity of utility 
to her health sensitivity to environmental quality. It further implies that the minimum 
anticipated income ( min1 jy ) for residing in the environmentally least hazardous location 








































6.  Residential dispersion and income distribution 
The previous sections’ analyses of the choice of location suggest that in the 
absence of asymmetric information about environmental qualities and rents and in the 
presence of open access, the dispersion of expected-lifetime-utility-maximising 
people across locations endowed with different environmental qualities is due to 
personal differences in health sensitivity to environmental quality, in utility’s 
consumption elasticity and in income.  
The persistence of hazardous facilities and land use close to residential 
neighbourhoods might be a reflection of the affected residents’ small political power. 
If political power is associated with economic power it can be expected that the more 
affluent the neighbourhood, the more effective the lobbying against hazardous 
facilities and land use in its vicinity. In other words, a strong association between 
residential location and income might contribute to the persistence of undesired 
sources of environmental hazards in and near low-income neighbourhoods.  
To facilitate the examination of the relationship between the population’s 
residential dispersion and income distribution, the following analysis considers the 
case described in section 4, in which personal income is not affected by the 
environmental quality of the place of residence, and assumes that there exists an 
interior solution to the location choice problem of each person. The analysis considers 
firstly the case where all people have the same health sensitivity to environmental 
quality and the same utility’s consumption elasticity. 
Let αα =j  and ββ =j  for every person Nj ,...,3,2,1=  and recall Eq. (13). 
























θ .       (18) 
Corollary 9: When all people have identical health sensitivity to environmental 
quality and identical utility’s consumption elasticity, high (low) income earners reside 
in less (more) exposed neighbourhoods to hazardous facilities and land use.  
























θ        (19) 
and the residential-location variance is    
)()])(/([)( 201 yVARRRVAR −+= βααθ .     (20) 
Compatibly with the statistical notion of the concentration coefficient, the residential-
dispersion coefficient (RDC) is defined as the ratio of residential-location variance to 


















     (21) 
where ))(/[)( 0RyEyVAR −  can be interpreted as the base-rent-adjusted income-
dispersion coefficient. 
Corollary 10: When all people have identical health sensitivity to environmental 
quality and identical utility’s consumption elasticity, the residential-dispersion 
coefficient is proportional to the base-rent adjusted income-dispersion coefficient. 
(See Appendix D for proof.) 
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Corollary 11: When all people have identical health sensitivity to environmental 
quality and identical utility’s consumption elasticity, the effect of the base-rent 
adjusted income-dispersion coefficient on the residential-dispersion coefficient is 
intensified by the population’s health sensitivity to environmental quality and 
moderated by the population’s consumption-elasticity of utility and the market rent-
gradient. (See Appendix D for proof.) 
Let us now consider the case where people’s health sensitivities to 
environmental quality and people’s consumption elasticities are not identical and let 
us denote the population means of health sensitivity to environmental quality, utility’s 
consumption elasticity and income by αµ , βµ  and yµ , respectively. Considering the 
first-order approximation of the interior solution displayed by Eq. (13) in the vicinity 
of these means, the variance of the chosen environmental quality of the place of 






























)]},(),()][/()([),( 0 yCOVyCOVRCOV y βµαµµµµµβαµµ αββαααβ −−++− . (22) 
As the computation of the RDC and the assessment of its properties, in this 
case, are tedious, the following corollaries are focused on the residential variance.  






 is positive (zero) and increasing in 
αµ  and decreasing with βµ  and 01 RR − . (See proof in Appendix D.) 
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This corollary implies that as long as some people’s health is sensitive to 
environmental quality, the residential-location variance increases with the income-
variance. The larger the group of such people and the higher their health sensitivity to 
environmental quality, the more profound the effect of the income variance on the 
residential-location variance. This effect is moderated by the average utility’s 
consumption elasticity within the population and by the market rent-gradient. 
Corollary 13: The residential-location variance increases with the variance of the 
health sensitivity to environmental quality and with the variance of the consumption 
elasticity of utility within the population. (See proof in Appendix D.) 
Corollary 14: The residential-location variance increases with the covariance between 
income and environmental sensitivity within the population, but decreases with the 
covariance between environmental sensitivity and consumption elasticity of utility 
and with the covariance between income and consumption elasticity of utility within 
the population. (See proof in Appendix D.) 
Corollary 15: If the mean of the environmental sensitivity is larger (smaller) than the 
mean of the consumption elasticity of utility within the population, the moderating 
effect of the covariance between income and consumption elasticity of utility 
dominates (is dominated by) the intensifying effect of the covariance between income 






A lifetime utility function was constructed under the assumption that life is 
uncertain and the probability of survival depends upon the environmental quality of 
the place of residence and the length of the period of exposure to hazardous facilities 
and land use. Lifetime utility from consumption is increased by the probability of 
survival. Using this environmental-quality adjusted utility function, the effect of 
environmental-quality improvement on the highest bid on a residential property was 
found to be positive and intensified by income and environmental sensitivity, but 
moderated by the consumption elasticity of utility, rate of time preference and rate of 
decline of survival probability stemming from continued exposure to hazardous 
facilities and land use. It was shown that when income is not affected by 
environmental quality, the optimal environmental quality of the place of residence is 
proportional to the ratio of the difference between the individual income and the rent 
in the most hazardous location to the difference between the rents in the least and 
most hazardous locations. The proportion-coefficient rises with the individual’s 
sensitivity to environmental quality and declines with her utility’s consumption-
elasticity.  
The possibility that productivity is positively affected by environmental 
quality was considered. It was found that when an interior solution to the location 
choice problem exists, the optimal environmental quality of the place of residence 
increases with the personal sensitivity to the environmental quality, with the marginal 
effect of the environmental quality on income and with the income-rent differential in 
the most hazardous location, but decreases with the utility’s consumption elasticity 
and with the marginal effect of the environmental quality on rent. Under certain 
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circumstances the solution to the location-choice problem is corner. When income in 
the most hazardous location is at least as large as the rent and when the 
environmental-quality effect on income is at least as large as its effect on rent, people 
maximise their consumption and minimise their risk of dying by residing in the least 
hazardous location. However, when income in the most hazardous location is equal to 
the rent and the environmental-quality effect on the market rent exceeds its effect on 
income people reside in the most hazardous location as they cannot afford renting, or 
bearing the user cost of, a property in a less hazardous location.  
When people are endowed with identical health sensitivities to environmental 
hazards and consumption elasticities of utility, their residential dispersion is closely 
related to the distribution of income. In the more likely case of heterogeneous 
population, the level of residential dispersion increases with the variances of income, 
environmental sensitivity and utility’s consumption elasticity and with the covariance 
between income and environmental sensitivity within the population, but decreases 
with the covariances between environmental sensitivity and utility’s consumption 
elasticity and between income and utility’s consumption elasticity within the 
population. The moderating effect of the covariance between income and utility’s 
consumption elasticity on the level of residential dispersion dominates the 
intensifying effect of the covariance between income and environmental sensitivity on 
the level of residential dispersion when the mean of environmental sensitivity is larger 
than the mean of utility’s consumption elasticity within the population. 
Frequently, political power is related to economic power, in which case a 
strong association between residential location and income might contribute to the 
persistence of hazardous facilities and land use in the vicinity of poor 
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neighbourhoods, whose lobbying effort is the least effective. The interior solution to 
the location-choice problem implies that a high level of income inequality within a 
population of rational people is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a strong 
association between residential location and income. A low correlation between 
income and sensitivity to environmental quality and a high correlation between 
income and utility’s consumption elasticity within the population may lead to 
residential dispersion where household income is not correlated with neighbourhood’s 
environmental quality.  However, the existence of hazardous facilities and land use in, 
or near, populated areas is perpetuated by a strong association between residential 
location and income, and, in turn, intensifies the association between residential 
location and income, when there is a high correlation between income and health 
sensitivity to environmental quality and a low correlation between income and 
utility’s consumption elasticity within the population. Furthermore, the higher the 
income-disparity level the greater the likelihood of persistent hazardous facilities and 
land use in the vicinity of poor neighbourhoods. When the level of income disparity is 
very high, corner solutions to individuals’ location choice problems are likely to be a 
common phenomenon, leading to residential polarisation of the population: low-
income earners living in low-environmental-quality locations and high-income 
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Appendix A: An explanation of the transition from Eq. (1) to Eq. (2) 
Recall that 
)(')( tFtf =           (A1) 



























        (A3) 
and  
U F t= − −( ( ))1 .        (A4) 





UdvUvvdUV .       (A5) 

















ρτ       (A6) 













−−= ∫ − ττρτ dueFUv       (A7) 















ρτ dueFUv       (A8) 
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as  
1)( =∞F .         (A9) 





UdvV .         (A10) 
By virtue of equation (A3) 
dv e d= −ρτ τ          (A11)  






−ρ         (A12) 
where 
)(1)( tFUt t −=−≡Ω        (A13) 
and indicating the probability of living at least until t . 
 
Appendix B: Proofs of corollaries 1 and 2 
Proof of Corollary 1: For 10 ≤< jα  the fact that 1/ <AB θθ  implies that 
)()( jAjj
j




A RR > . For 0=jα , 
)()( jAjj
j




A RR = . 
























 and increases with jy  and jα  but 
decreases with jβ , jρ  and jµ . 
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Appendix C: First and second order conditions for maximum and proofs of 
corollaries 3-7 
The location-choice problem is  
)}/())(({max µρθθ α
θ
+= cuV  
where the index j is omitted for tractability and Ryc −≡ . 
 The first-order condition (f.o.c.) for maximum 



























From the f.o.c., the first term on the r.h.s. of the s.o.c. is equal to zero, and as )(θc  is 
taken to be linear, the s.o.c. can be rendered as  
)())(())(()1( θθθθα ccucu ′′′<′+ . 
Recalling also that βcu = ,  
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)()()1()()1( 21 θθβθβθβα ββ ccc ′−<+ −−  
or, equivalently, 
)()1()()1( θβθθα cc ′−<+ . 















When only rent is affected by location, 
])([)( 010 θθ RRRyc −+−=  
































where, by virtue of our assumption ( 10 ≤≤ α  and 10 << β ), the term on the r.h.s. is 
positive. 
When income is also affected by location 
])([])([)( 010010 θθθ RRRyyyc −+−−+=  





































where the term on the r.h.s. is positive. 



















 there exists an interior solution to the 
location-choice problem.  By substituting Eq. (12), 01 RRR −=′  and 



























θ . The rest is straightforward from this expression. 

























rearranging the terms in this inequality, 1* =jθ  if 
))(/())(/1( 011010 RRRRRRy jjjjj −+=−++≥ αβαβ . 

















Ry , where 
the term on the r.h.s. is positive. If 000 >− Ry  the satisfaction of the s.o.c. requires 
that 0101 yyRR −>− . If 000 <− Ry  the satisfaction of the s.o.c. requires 
that 0101 yyRR −<− . 
Proof of Corollary 6: Straightforward from Eq. (16).    
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 and hence the s.o.c. for maximum is 
not satisfied and the solution to the location-choice problem is corner: 10** orj =θ . 
When 00 Ry j ≥  and 0101 RRyy jj −≥−  environmentally sensitive individuals 
maximise their consumption and minimise their risk of dying by residing in the least 
hazardous environment. When 00 Ry j =  and 0101 RRyy jj −<−  people reside in the 
most hazardous location since safer ones are not affordable. 































By rearranging the terms in this inequality, 1* =jθ  if 
)]())[(/()]())[(/1( 01011010101 jjjjjjjjj yyRRRyyRRRy −−−+=−−−++≥ αβαβ
 
Appendix D: Proofs of corollaries 9 and 15 
Proof of Corollary 9: Straightforward from Eq. (18).  
Proof of Corollary 10: Straightforward from Eq. (21). 
Proof of Corollary 11: Straightforward from Eq. (21). 
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Proof of Corollary 13 and Corollary 14: Straightforward from Eq. (22) as long as 
00 >− Ryµ . Supply and demand consideration and the assumption that rent increases 
with environmental quality imply that 00 >− Ryµ . Otherwise, people with income 
lower than the mean, as well as people earning the mean income and consume, could 
not afford renting a residential property. 













































VAR y . 
